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Abstract 
The UK’s counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST) seeks to pursue individuals 
involved in suspected terrorism (‘Pursue’) and seeks to minimise the risk of people 
becoming ‘future’ terrorists by employing policies and practices structured to pre-
emptively incapacitate and socially exclude them (‘Prevent’). This article demonstrates 
that this two-pronged approach is based on a framework of counterinsurgency; a 
military doctrine used against non-state actors that encourages, amongst other things, 
the blanket surveillance of populations and the targeting of propaganda at them. The 
use of counterinsurgency theory and practice in the UK’s ‘war on terror’ blurs the 
distinction between Pursue and Prevent, coercion and consent, and, ultimately, civilian 
and combatant. This challenges the liberal claim that counter-terrorism policies, 
especially Prevent, are about social inclusivity or ‘safeguarding’ and that the UK 
government is accountable to the people.  
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Introduction 
 
The UK’s official counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST) is divided into four 
policy strands – Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare. The two last strands are 
premised on increasing the resilience of the UK through enhanced protective 
security measures (Protect) and working towards mitigating the effects of a 
terrorist attack, lest it cannot be thwarted (Prepare) (HM Government, 2009, 
2011b). Pursue is concerned with subjecting suspected terrorists at home and 
abroad to military, policing, intelligence, and judicial measures. Prevent is the 
strand that deals with countering the ideology and grievances propagated by 
terrorists and their alleged supporters through counter-propaganda or  ‘hearts 
and minds’ activity (HM Government, 2009, 2011b). 
When Prevent was publicly introduced in 2007, the focus was largely  on 
targeting ‘violent’ extremist ideology but since 2010, the programme   has 
been widened to include ‘non-violent extremism’ on the basis that it     is ‘part 
of a terrorist ideology’ (HM Government, 2011a: 6). Individuals  who 
propagate a ‘terrorist ideology’ or ‘non-violent extremism’ are claimed to act 
in a manner that reinforces and legitimises terrorism. They are ‘the pool in 
which terrorists will swim’, claims Charles Farr, the Head of the Office for 
Security and Counter-Terrorism, and thus enable terrorists to ‘operate with a 
degree of impunity’ (House of Commons, 2009: Evidence 29). ‘Draining’ this 
pool is what Prevent seeks to do in three ways: by dis- rupting individuals 
believed to propagate violent and non-violent extrem- ism, by promoting a 
mainstream or ‘moderate’ form of Islam to act as a bulwark against ‘extremist’ 
Islam, and by challenging  those  individuals  who have internalised, or are 
likely to internalise, extremist ideology via  the Channel ‘de-radicalisation’ 
programme. In order to ensure this triangu- lar approach is fruitful, Prevent 
has two ‘enabling’ objectives – to collect and develop intelligence, and to craft 
and improve ‘strategic communica- tion’ (HM Government, 2009: 14). The 
integration of these two practices into the Prevent programme, as this article 
will demonstrate, suggests that the dichotomy between Pursue and Prevent 
is false. This is because sur- veillance has long been recognised to be a part 
of a coercive infrastructure used to socially control individuals and 
communities because of the ‘pan- opticon’ and ‘disciplinary’ effect it gives 
rise to (Foucault, 1977). This is  why ‘information-gathering and espionage 
organisations [are] added to the [state’s] investment in the means of violence’ 
(Wrong, 1979: 43–44). The same logic applies to ‘strategic communication’ 
too; a propaganda practice that aims to communicate messages not only 
through words and images  but through ‘aggressive’ and ‘manipulative’ action 
for the purpose of induc- ing behavioural change (Ministry of Defence, 2009: 
6–5). Since strategic communication is undertaken through Prevent, and 
since this communica- tive practice relies on ‘aggressive’ and ‘manipulative’ 
methods, this article 
   
 
argues that a coercive underbelly to Prevent is revealed as well as a direct 
connection with counterinsurgency theory and doctrine. 
Counterinsurgency-infused counter-terrorism practices are being increas- 
ingly used in a domestic setting largely because political Islamic groups such 
as al-Qaida are claimed to comprise a global jihadist insurgency that threat- 
ens Western nation-states and their interests at home and abroad (Mockaitis, 
2003; Cassidy, 2008; Mackinlay, 2008; Kilcullen, 2010). Those who view al-
Qaida (and more recently the Islamic State group) in such a way contend that 
the group brings together a set of ‘loosely allied insurgents and terrorist 
groups’ who operate across the globe, in various different theatres and arenas 
under their respective banner but employ tactics and methods that are tai- 
lored to a specific environment (Kilcullen, 2010: 198–199, 190; 2007a). The 
‘global jihad’, writes the influential counterinsurgency soldier and theorist 
David Kilcullen, represents ‘a federated virtual state’ and even though al- 
Qaida ‘controls no territory or population, [it] exercises control … that … 
represent[s] many elements of traditional state power’; though it is a type of 
‘pseudo-state’ (2010: 200). In countering this pseudo-state, counter-terrorism 
techniques, though important, are limited in what they can achieve (Kilcul- 
len, 2010: 190). This is because counter-terrorism is largely understood to be 
a ‘kinetic’ (i.e., violent) affair whereas counterinsurgency seeks to disrupt and 
undermine the strategy and support of the insurgency by winning over the 
acquiescence of the population by employing both violent and non-violent 
instruments of state power – civil, political, and military (Mackinlay, 2008: 6). 
Because of this all-encompassing approach, especially the focus on non- 
violent or ‘non-kinetic’ activities, using a counterinsurgency framework to 
deal with political Islamic groups is increasingly being supported by some 
military practitioners, government officials, and counter-extremism think 
tanks too (Mackinlay, 2008; Miliband, 2009; Kilcullen, 2010; Benotman 
et al., 2013; Quilliam Foundation, 2016). 
With non-violent activity going to the core of counterinsurgency doc- 
trine and counter-terrorism debates in the UK largely focusing on Prevent, it 
is possible to view such techniques, especially ‘de-radicalisation’, as an exten- 
sion of social welfare policies that aim to reform lawbreakers, insurgents, and 
terrorists into positive and productive members of society. Since the 1970s, 
however, criminal justice policies have, in the name of reform and support, 
largely been framed around trying to pre-emptively incapacitate and exclude 
lawbreakers (Garland, 2001; Moore, 2014), especially suspected insurgents 
and potential terrorists (Hocking, 1988, 1993; Miller and Sabir, 2012). Cur- 
rent counter-terrorism policy and practice is no different. Indeed, exceptional 
counter-terrorism laws that have pre-emptive incapacitation and social exclu- 
sion at their core form a critical part of contemporary counter-terrorism policy 
and practice; suggesting a securitisation of social policy (see Ragazzi, this 
issue). Take ‘Terrorism Prevention Investigative Measures’ (formerly known 
   
 
as ‘Control Orders’), for instance. The purpose of this measure is to pre- 
emptively incapacitate suspected terrorists on the basis of ‘secret’ intelligence 
before they have committed an alleged crime by subjecting them to a form of 
‘house-arrest’. This measure seems less about reform and inclusivity and more 
about punishment and exclusion. Similarly, a number of contemporary ter- 
rorism offences such as Section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000 have been intro- 
duced to criminalise the possession of documentation without due regard for 
the purpose or intent of the possession. The purpose here is to disrupt and 
incapacitate individuals who are simply in possession of information deemed 
useful to terrorists, irrespective of whether they intend to use the information 
for terrorism. Exclusion, risk-minimisation, and punishment, in other words, 
seem to be the objective of counter-terrorism; not social inclusion and reform. 
The same logic applies to Prevent too, where surveilling ‘potential’ or ‘future’ 
terrorists in order to subject them to Channel ‘de-radicalisation’, in practice, 
leads to a sense of exclusion and isolation; not a sense of inclusivity or belong- 
ing. Such exclusionary practices have a highly racialised component to them, 
and even though they may be seen as a departure from the assimilationist 
social policies of the 1970s towards what Gail Lewis (2000: 276–277) calls   a 
‘cultural pluralist’ approach that generates an impression of an ‘inclusive 
multicultural society’, in practice, they dictate the governance of ‘others’ based 
upon essentialised understandings of race, gender, and ethnicity. In counter- 
terrorism policies such as Prevent, we can see a continuation of such racialisa- 
tion processes at play in the governance of the Muslim ‘other’ (see Ragazzi, 
this issue). At the same time, we see the institutionalisation of a policy that 
claims to be about social inclusion and ‘safeguarding’ but is, in practice, disci- 
plining, excluding, and preventing individuals from articulating a distinctive 
Muslim agency and identity (Sayyid, 2010: 15). 
The introduction of counter-terrorism policies based on an essentialist 
understanding of the Muslim ‘other’, this article argues, has permitted sur- 
veillance and propaganda to be targeted at Muslim communities in the UK 
in a blanket fashion, especially those Muslims who think and speak through, 
what Sayyid terms, ‘the language of Islam’ (2015: 17). Such methods and 
practices, I argue, not only blur the line between Pursue and Prevent or coer- 
cion and consent but ultimately fail to distinguish between civilians and com- 
batants. In order to showcase how this blurring has happened, this article   is 
split into four sections. The first section explains how counterinsurgency 
came into existence in the colonies and how this doctrine is a continuation of 
colonial warfare on the ‘home-front’. The purpose of opening the article with 
this backdrop is to ensure the reader recognises how contemporary counter- 
terrorism policy and practice rather than being ‘new’ or ‘unique’ is in fact a 
continuation of historic practices and methods used to maintain social con- 
trol against the racialised ‘other’ in the colonies. The second section employs 
a Gramscian framework to theoretically analyse the relationship between 
   
 
coercion and consent. Such a framework will help reveal how the false dichot- 
omy between Prevent and Pursue exists and operates in practice. The third 
and fourth sections demonstrate how these blurred boundaries exist and oper- 
ate in practice by empirically examining two coercive practices undertaken 
through Prevent – surveillance and propaganda (termed ‘strategic commu- 
nication’ in policy parlance). The article argues that the use of a counterin- 
surgency-infused counter-terrorism framework that targets surveillance and 
propaganda at Muslim communities en masse challenges the liberal claim that 
counter-terrorism policy is about social inclusivity and ‘safeguarding’, or that 
the government is accountable to the people. 
 
Counterinsurgency and colonial warfare 
 
Counterinsurgency is a form of low-intensity warfare that revolves around a 
set of unconventional military tactics and techniques used against armed non- 
state actors. It was first used by Western states to suppress the armed anti- 
colonial guerrilla movements (‘insurgency’) that emerged in the late 19th and 
early-mid 20th centuries. It was in colonial India around the mid 1800s that 
the UK first began using methods of repression and social control against 
indigenous communities fighting to liberate their homeland from imperial- 
ism and colonialism by using low-level ‘hit and run’ military tactics. These 
measures not only would go on to be applied to other UK colonies such as 
Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, and Northern Ireland but would eventually set the 
tone for contemporary counterinsurgency theory and practice too. The justi- 
fication for using exceptional and highly militarised methods of social con- 
trol and discipline in the colonies was based on an Orientalist discourse that 
constructed the non-European world to be inferior and prone to barbarism 
and was therefore in need of ‘civilising’ (Said, 1978). The UK’s use of coun- 
terinsurgency in Northern Ireland during ‘the Troubles’ was in this sense 
quite unique since it was the first time that highly coercive techniques that 
had been reserved for racialised ‘others’ located on the periphery were now 
being applied to opponents within the metropole. At the same time, meth- 
ods of surveillance and social control that had been mastered in the North of 
Ireland were slowly being integrated into everyday policing and criminal 
justice policies in the rest of the UK too. The main targets here would become 
dissidents and activists, trade unionists as well as those claimed to be ‘sub- 
versives’ allegedly conspiring with the Kremlin to overthrow parliamentary 
democracy (Schlesinger, 1978; Bunyan, 1980, 1981; Hain, 1986; Hocking, 
1988, 1993; Milne, 2004; Whyte and Poynting, 2012). The use of highly 
coercive counterinsurgency methods and strategies in a domestic UK setting 
is therefore neither new nor without historical precedent (Spjut, 1978). What 
is new, however, is the manner in which UK counterinsurgency doctrine since 
   
 
the mid 1960s has combined two ‘models’ of countering insurgency in order 
to fulfil its goal of maintaining power, disciplining particular communities, 
and socially controlling populations more broadly. 
The first model, often termed the ‘enemy-centric’ approach, seeks to  
employ direct violence against the insurgency as a way of weakening and 
destroying it. The ‘population-centric’ model, on the other hand, contends 
that whilst employment of exceptional but limited levels of violence should 
be used against the insurgency, it is vital for the counterinsurgent to focus on 
providing security, governance, and jobs for the population as a way of secur- 
ing their acquiescence and slowly working towards weakening and eventu- 
ally destroying the insurgency (Chin, 2015: 97; Kilcullen, 2007c). From the 
1960s until the present day, UK counterinsurgency doctrine has combined 
both models and focused on: 
  Integrating civilian and military power more closely,  Using limited but exceptional levels of force against suspected insur- 
gents,  Strengthening surveillance and intelligence networks and capacities,  Using legal powers to pre-emptively incapacitate suspected insurgents 
(‘lawfare’), and  Directing propaganda at the population from which the insurgent 
stems through so-called ‘hearts and minds’ activity (Ministry of 
Defence, 1969a, 1969b, 1970, 1995, 2001, 2009). 
 
What is evident from the combined models here is the synergy between 
violence and non-violence, or put another way, between ‘hard-power’ and 
‘soft-power’. ‘Hard-power’ is used here to mean force and violence that seeks 
to restrict the freedom of a social agent through confinement, injury, and/or 
the destruction of life itself (Wrong, 1979: 24). In a counterinsurgency and 
counter-terrorism context, the use of hard-power would constitute actions 
such as stop and search, arrest, detention, imprisonment, shootings, bomb- 
ings, assassinations and so forth. ‘Soft-power’ is used to mean non-violent 
action that seeks to influence a social agent and make them change their 
behaviour. In a counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism context, the use of 
soft-power would typically involve the use of financial reward and induce- 
ments, developing a rapport with people/populations in order to develop 
intelligence, and the crafting and dissemination of propaganda or ‘strategic 
communication’. What is worth emphasising is that even though soft-power 
may be non-violent, it can still be highly coercive and therefore, in practice, 
create the same outcome or effect as an act of violence. Exactly how both forms 
of power are combined in order to fulfil state objectives, discipline groups, 
and socially control populations can be better understood by drawing on  
Antonio Gramsci’s (1971) seminal work on hegemony. Such a framework is 
   
 
especially helpful in theoretically understanding the false dichotomy between 
coercion and consent, and ultimately, Prevent and Pursue. 
 
Coercion, consent, and counterinsurgency 
 
The government or executive (what Gramsci calls ‘political society’) main- 
tains hegemony in two separate but intricately connected ways. The first is by 
having the capacity to employ violence and the second is through the manu- 
facturing of consent through civil society (Buttigieg, 1995). State violence,  it 
is important to emphasise, can be legitimately employed against one’s own 
population but is rarely used by advanced capitalist nations such as the UK, 
especially on a large scale. This is because violence is almost always experi- 
enced by the recipient ‘in alienating ways’ and ‘arouses feelings of hostility 
and acts of resistance’ (Scott, 2001: 14). Indeed, even Gramsci himself recog- 
nised that violence was ‘worse than ineffectual because [it was] conducive to 
reaction’ (Buttigieg, 1995: 13–14). Whilst violence therefore has an ability  to 
generate some level of obedience or compliance, it cannot generate consent, 
and certainly not in a way that grants the state widespread legitimacy. People 
who do not consent to a system of power, in other words, are not necessarily 
‘falsely conscious’ and acting in a way that goes against their interests because 
they are duped. Rather, they may be being prudent and strategic out of fear 
of the consequences of non-compliance (Scott, 1990: 82–83). However, fear 
is not the only way through which states exercise their power. While com- 
pliance requires the internalisation of coercion to some degree, consent does 
not. Consent requires individuals to agree with a particular course of action. 
The way they come to agree or give consent to a particular course of action 
is by having their ideas and thoughts influenced by the state. This process  of 
influence takes place by the state’s piercing and manufacturing of civil society. 
Civil society is not therefore an absolute realm of ‘freedom’ that is separate 
from the state. Instead, it is the sphere in which consent for a hege- monic 
system is manufactured and maintained (Buttigieg, 1995: 6–7, 26; Gramsci, 
1971: 243). This is not to say that by piercing civil society the gov- ernment 
becomes a ‘puppet-master’ that has an ability to control and dictate everything 
the population does, says or thinks. ‘Power’s third dimension’, observes 
Lukes, ‘is always focused on particular domains of experience and is never, 
except in fictional dystopias, more than partially effective’ (2005: 150). 
Hegemony can be, and often is, subject to resistance and challenge. The state 
cannot therefore co-opt or interpellate counter-hegemony into its framework 
through civil society all the time. Instead, what the state does to undermine 
counter-hegemony is blunt the demands for social and political change. It 
does this by meeting the needs of the population to some degree, protecting 
the rights of the working classes, and allowing them some space to 
   
 
organise and compete for power to varying degrees. It is precisely this type of 
activity that enables the state to generate a feeling of fairness and, ultimately, 
consent for its power (Buttigieg, 1995: 12). According to Buttigieg (1995: 12), 
Gramsci described such a course of action by the state as a sort of ‘bour- geois 
state socialism – i.e., a nonsocialist socialism where even the proletariat did 
not look too unkindly on the state as government; convinced, rightly or 
wrongly, that its interests were being looked after’. It is not the sole capacity 
to use violence that gives the state its power to govern then. It is, instead, the 
piercing of civil society as well as the providing of social welfare and some 
political freedom that enable the state to maintain hegemony and be resilient 
in the face of counter-hegemonic resistance. However, if and when counter- 
hegemonic resistance threatens the state directly, the state always has the 
capacity to employ violence. Coercion, in other words, may only have a small 
role to play in a system of hegemony but it is always present in the back- 
ground, operating in conjunction with consent. It is neither separate nor too 
far removed from it. This is what Gramsci meant when he said ‘hegemony is 
protected through the armour of coercion’ (1971: 263). To talk of there being 
a difference between coercion and consent (or Pursue and Prevent) then is not 
only to misunderstand the nature of hegemony but to make something black 
and white that is fundamentally grey. I will now demonstrate how the grey 
area between coercion and consent articulates itself in practice by examining 
surveillance practices undertaken through Prevent. 
 
Back-door surveillance 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the focus for the UK gov- 
ernment was on detecting, disrupting, and prosecuting suspected terrorists 
using hard-power or the Pursue policy. The main priority was not therefore 
on Prevent or ‘de-radicalisation’. According to David Omand, the former 
Director-General of GCHQ and the architect of the CONTEST strategy, the 
focus was instead on overseas diplomacy, preventing al-Qaida from securing 
‘safe-havens’ and then working towards developing ‘counter-narratives’ that 
would ‘win back the hearts and minds of young British Muslims’ (Omand, 
2010: 101). The phrase ‘hearts and minds’ has become a central theme within 
the Prevent strategy and is cited in counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency 
discourse as well as being repeatedly (and alas uncritically) used by a range of 
(well-meaning) individuals when discussing security issues. But what does the 
phrase ‘hearts and minds’ actually mean? The phrase is constructed to mean 
cooperation and partnership and something that is largely non-threatening 
and non-coercive. As a practice, however, it is highly coercive. This is because 
‘hearts and minds’ is based on combining the use of inducements and rewards 
as a way of securing the emotional support of social agents (their ‘hearts’) with 
   
 
hard-power, including violence and threats of violence, to influence the cog- 
nitive faculties of social agents (their ‘minds’). Even though the phrase ‘may 
generally indicate a less coercive, conventional approach’, observes Dixon 
(2009a: 378), who examines the multiple meanings and interpretations of  
‘hearts and minds’, the phrase ‘disguises the reality of high levels of violence 
and the alienation of the local population’ caused as a result of such activity. 
The term may have a tendency to be used to describe so-called ‘softer-edged’ 
counter-terrorism practices that are claimed to be about persuasion, partner- 
ship, friendship and so forth, but in practice, the concept combines these with 
fear, threats, and coercion as a way of effecting behavioural change. A good 
example of coercion masquerading as persuasion under Prevent concerns sur- 
veillance and intelligence, and as the penultimate section in this article will 
show, propaganda and ‘strategic communication’. 
It is well-recognised in counter-terrorism practice and counterinsurgency 
theory and doctrine that subjecting suspected insurgents and terrorists to mil- 
itary force is dependent upon understanding who the insurgent/terrorist is and 
where they may be hiding. ‘If it is accepted that the problem of defeating the 
enemy consists very largely of finding him’, writes retired soldier and coun- 
terinsurgency theorist Frank Kitson, ‘it is easy to recognize the paramount 
importance of good information’ (1971: 95). There are, however, two types of 
information – background information and contact information. Background 
information is overt and is collected by police and military officers during the 
course of their duty, and through open-source intelligence (OSINT). Contact 
intelligence, on the other hand, is covert and ‘enables security forces to find 
their enemies by knowing their intentions or likely actions’ (Clutterbuck, 
1990: 12). It is ultimately the former – background intelligence – that this arti- cle 
is concerned with here. This is because whilst a lot may be made of ‘secret’ 
intelligence, military theorists and members of the intelligence community 
reject the view that this is the most important source of information. ‘Pos- 
sessing secrets does not always confer advantage’, writes David Omand (2010: 
22). Kilcullen (2006: 123–124) similarly notes: 
 
in modern counter-insurgency, where there is no single insurgent network to be 
penetrated but rather a cultural and demographic jungle of population groups to 
be navigated, ‘basic intelligence’ – detailed knowledge of physical, human, 
cultural and informational terrain, based on a combination of open source 
research and ‘denied area ethnography’ – will be even more critical [than secret 
intelligence]. 
 
While much may be made of secret or covert intelligence, it is not the 
only manner, and certainly not the most important manner, through which 
an understanding can be formed of the opponent and the population against 
which force and propaganda should be targeted. Overt intelligence collection 
   
 
has a vital role to play. This is significant where Prevent is concerned since 
most of the intelligence collected for Prevent purposes is collected by the 
police through overt mechanisms. 
The police playing a lead role in the development of intelligence, with the 
military operating in a supporting role, is a counterinsurgency principle that 
was used by the UK in Northern Ireland (Dixon, 2009b: 448). Whilst the 
military were involved in intelligence collection and analysis, it was the police 
in the form of Special Branch and the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), with 
input from the Security Services (MI5) that were primarily responsible for the 
collection of intelligence (Jeffery, 1987). Dixon (2009b: 448, 464–465) 
explains that there are three reasons why the police take primacy on intel- 
ligence matters. Firstly, they have a strong familiarity with a given terrain, 
culture, and population, which enables them to gather intelligence whether 
they are on or off duty. Secondly, police have a localised understanding of a 
given area or territory and can therefore develop more accurate and timely 
intelligence based on some level of trust that has been built up with the local 
population that would otherwise be difficult to achieve, especially for the 
military. Thirdly, compared to military units, who are often deployed    to a 
particular territory for a set period of time and may be withdrawn on political 
grounds, the police are situated in a territory permanently. This has two 
benefits: the police can create an image of ‘normality’ in what may be a volatile 
and exceptional situation, and the collection of intelligence becomes a 
routine, everyday task. This is made more straightforward because the police 
are permanently based in a community and will not be withdrawn in the same 
way as the military may. 
Continuity in intelligence and having a permanent presence, in other 
words, is invaluable for countering an insurgency. ‘If a unit can stay in the 
same region for a long time’, writes Kitson, ‘[it] is worth several times as many 
men who are constantly moved from one place to another, because of the 
background knowledge which the stationary troops can build up in a 
particular area’ (1971: 92). Through the creation of a new network of ‘Coun- 
ter-Terrorism Units’ (CTUs) and ‘Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Units’, 
CONTEST has very much put this counterinsurgency idea into practice. 
However, it goes one step further since the CTU network not only seeks to 
tap into already existing community policing processes but has worked to cre- 
ate Prevent policing roles whose primary role is to collect overt intelligence 
on suspected and potential terrorists as well as locations alleged to be used for 
‘radicalisation’ (House of Commons, 2009: Evidence 14 by ACC Bob Quick; 
West Midlands Police Authority, 2010: 1). In addition to these new policing 
posts, Figure 1, which is taken from a classified strategic police document 
(Association of Chief Police Officers TAM, 2008: 11) that was leaked on to 
the internet, shows that intelligence is also collected for Prevent purposes 
through Schedule 7 and the (now defunct) Section 44 stop and search power 
   
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Pyramid diagram taken from a leaked classified document authored by 
the Association of Chief Police Officers showing the types of surveillance methods 
used to determine which types of Prevent activity should be directed at different 
individuals/groups. 
Source: Association of Chief Police Officers (Terrorism and Allied Matters) (2008: 11) [http:// 
www.scribd.com/doc/35833660/ACPO-Police-Prevent-Strategy]. 
 
too. Both of these methods of collecting intelligence, Figure 1 shows, are 
directed at ‘all members of the community’ (Association of Chief Police Offi- 
cers TAM, 2008: 11). 
This is significant not only because all members of the community are 
being surveilled and treated as suspected or potential terrorists but rather 
because these methods and tactics are claimed to be reserved for Pursue. There 
is therefore, in practice, a blurring of boundaries between Pursue and Pre- 
vent (i.e., coercion–consent or hard–soft power) which the authorities seem 
unconcerned by. Responding to written questions posed by the author, the 
Assistant Commissioner of Specialist Operations at New Scotland Yard, Cres- 
sida Dick (2012), explained that Prevent counter-terrorism neighbourhood 
policing programmes had been embedded at a local level in order to ‘direct 
and influence local and national counter-terrorism … activities’. Prevent 
officers, in other words, are collecting intelligence for Prevent purposes but 
   
 
are feeding their overt intelligence into a covert intelligence collection and 
analysis system (called ‘Rich Picture’) that subsequently influences all types of 
counter-terrorism activity, including operations and arrests. This idea of using 
Prevent intelligence for Pursue activities was corroborated by the for- mer 
Head of the West Midlands Counter-Terrorism Unit in an interview with the 
author: 
 
If as a result of Rich Picture and gathering community intelligence, a location or 
a place that requires further work [is identified], of course there is going to be an 
overlap […] between Prevent and Pursue. I’m not going to suggest that there is 
a world of Prevent over there and there is a world of Pursue over here. (Interview 
with Kenny Bell, 13 April 2012) 
 
In practice then, both Prevent and Pursue are complementary and sup- 
portive of one another, especially where matters concern intelligence and sur- 
veillance. This is significant for three reasons which are worth emphasising. 
Firstly, surveillance generates fear and a threat of violence and therefore has an 
ability to discipline thought and control behaviour without directly employ- 
ing force (Foucault, 1977). Since surveillance goes to the heart of Prevent, a 
highly coercive underbelly is revealed. Secondly, Prevent operates in a com- 
plementary capacity to surveillance and intelligence collection that is claimed 
to be reserved for Pursue. This strongly suggests that the dichotomy between 
coercion and consent or Pursue and Prevent is false and irrelevant in practice. 
Thirdly, the surveilling of ‘all members of the community’ in order to deter- 
mine which form of activity (or propaganda – see Figure 1 and Figure 2) needs 
to be targeted at them suggests that Prevent perceives law-abiding Muslims 
to be somehow susceptible to supporting or becoming involved in terrorism. 
Such a perception not only has a strong stench of Islamophobia but also shows 
how the counterinsurgency principle of treating the wider population as an 
enabler and supporter of insurgency and terrorism has been integrated into 
contemporary counter-terrorism policy and practice. Such a practice erodes 
the distinction between civilians and combatants. This blurring is further 
revealed when we examine the role that propaganda and ‘strategic communi- 
cation’ play in Prevent, and those against whom it is targeted. 
 
Propaganda as ‘strategic communication’ 
 
It has long been recognised that due to the communicative characteristics of 
deeds, actions can have as much psychological impact on a target group as can 
information that is disseminated through, for example, leaflets and broadcasts 
(Ramakrishna, 2002: 13). Strategic communication is a communicative prac- 
tice that is concerned with precisely this – undertaking actions in order to 
   
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Diagram created by the author and based on Figure 1.1 from Kilcullen 
(2010: 8), specifying where surveillance and intelligence networks operate and who 
constitutes an ‘audience for propaganda’. 
Source: David Kilcullen (2010) Counterinsurgency, p. 8. C. Hurst & Co. Reproduced with 
permission. 
 
communicate messages. According to official UK military doctrine, ‘strategic 
communication’ is defined as a ‘philosophy’ that is based on ‘the alignment of 
words, images and actions’ for the purpose of realising influence and causing 
behavioural change (Ministry of Defence, 2012: 1–3). Exactly how strategic 
communication operates is best explained by David Kilcullen, who is cited in 
the chapter on ‘Influence’ in the UK’s latest Counterinsurgency Field Manual: 
 
Traditionally in the course of conventional operations we use information operations 
to explain what we are doing, but in counterinsurgency we should design operations 
to enact our influence campaign. (Ministry of Defence, 2009: 6-2) 
 
This distinction between ‘explaining’ and ‘enacting’ is central to under- 
standing the contemporary approach to information and strategic commu- 
nication. Information is now viewed as a weapon of war in and of itself as 
opposed to being a means of supporting weapons of war. This is significant  for 
two interrelated reasons. Firstly, it shows that the distinction between hard-
power and strategic communication is false, and, secondly, since it seeks to 
influence behaviour through actions, strategic communication bears more 
than a passing resemblance to ‘propaganda of the deed’ or, as Kilcullen has 
described it, ‘armed propaganda’ (2007b, 2010: 222). 
While information collected by the police through overt surveillance 
mechanisms feeds into the strategic communication process (Association of 
   
 
Chief Police Officers TAM, 2008: 8), this is not the only way of inform-   ing 
such activity. Of more value, argue Lee Rowland and Commander Steve 
Tatham1 is social scientific research, or what they term ‘Target Audience 
Analysis’ (2010: 3; see also MacKay and Tatham, 2011). David Kilcullen 
(2007d) strongly encourages the use of social scientific research as a way of 
generating an understanding of the opponent’s culture too, though he refers 
to it as ‘conflict ethnography’. Under such an approach, he explains, the coun- 
terinsurgent works to develop ‘a deep, situation-specific understanding of the 
human, social and cultural dimensions of a conflict’ (Kilcullen, 2007d). This 
exact approach was used during the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. In both 
cases, anthropologists (in the form of ‘Human Terrain Teams’) were used by 
the US military to study cultures within both countries in order to inform 
policy and practice (Miller and Mills, 2010; Ministry of Defence, 2013). What 
is noteworthy about such an approach is that, firstly, the integration of social 
science into the ‘war on terror’ mirrors the use of anthropology by colonial 
powers, which Chin (2015: 99) observes, was a discipline ‘at the intellectual 
heart of the imperial project and was itself suffused with notions of a superior 
west facing an inferior Eastern enemy’. The parallels between contemporary 
counter-terrorism and colonial counterinsurgency are quite clear to see in this 
regard. Secondly, the integration of state-sponsored social science into the 
‘war on terror’ does not only mean that entire populations and communities 
are targeted for information gathering purposes (as vividly shown by David 
Kilcullen in Figure 2) but rather that such research is becoming ‘weaponised’ 
within its own right. This is because research findings are integrated, espe- 
cially through strategic communication activity, with hard or ‘kinetic’ power. 
Though it may therefore seem innocuous and innocent, state-sanctioned social 
scientific research that seeks to study and understand the opponent’s culture 
and society for the purpose of ‘influence’ through strategic communication 
serves coercion and therefore becomes coercive itself. 
In the UK, the task of researching Muslim communities and their cul- 
tural practices for the sake of informing strategic communication activity has 
fallen to the Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU). The 
RICU was established in 2007 by a number of influential civil servants and 
military personnel, including Commander Steve Tatham, who, until recently, 
led a psychological operations unit within the Ministry of Defence known as 
the 15 (UK) PSYOPS Group (Miller and Sabir, 2012). Since its formation, 
the RICU has undertaken a series of research projects as well as having com- 
missioned external agencies, including academics, to undertake research on 
UK Muslim communities (Powerbase, 2011). These projects were specifically 
designed to generate information on: 
  ‘how young British Muslims felt about their identity and sense of 
belonging’ 
   
 
 ‘how young British Muslims use the internet’  ‘media consumption among British Muslims’  ‘how Government messages are perceived by Muslim communities’  ‘Islamic Blogs’  ‘The Language of Terrorism’  ‘why some voices are more credible than others to Muslim communi- 
ties’, and  ‘understandings of “Britishness” and terrorism and where these feel- 
ings come from within the British population’ (Powerbase, 2011). 
 
While the basic details of some of the research conducted by the RICU had to 
be dragged out of the Home Office through the Freedom of Information Act 
by the author and colleagues, significant details, including copies of research, 
even the titles of some projects, still remain secret. Whilst the RICU may not 
be a part of the security and intelligence services, observes Sayyid, it cer- tainly 
is part of the ‘secret state’, much like its predecessor – the Information 
Research Department (IRD) – was during the Cold War (2013: footnote 1). 
Nevertheless, from two of the reports that were released by the RICU, and 
based on recent information that has surfaced in the media, one can see the 
types of propaganda the RICU has been responsible for producing. 
In one of its research reports, the RICU sought to understand and identify 
individuals and groups who were considered to be ‘vulnerable’ to becoming 
future terrorists, and the channels or ‘conduits’ that could most effectively 
‘de-radicalise’ them. It found that the most ‘vulnerable’ to terrorist messages 
were Pakistani, Bengali, and Somali males, aged 18–30; hence this group  was 
selected as the ‘core target audience’ for anti-extremism messages and 
programmes (RICU, 2010a: 4, 13). Another research project undertaken   by 
the RICU was premised on ‘identify[ing] individuals and organisations 
Muslim communities find credible at local, national and international level’ 
(RICU, 2010b: 1). It found that the most ‘credible’ conduits were family and 
friends, community figures, professionals, religious figures, and a small num- 
ber of political figures, media personalities and celebrities (RICU, 2010b: 30). 
The research also found that an individual’s ‘appearance and manner’ along 
with a series of ‘qualities’ were required for an individual to be cred- ible 
(RICU, 2010b: 2). The appearance and manner related to an individual being 
well-presented, interested in Muslim community issues and concerns, 
passionate, charismatic, articulate, and from an ethnic minority background. 
The qualities s/he should possess included being knowledgeable, empathetic, 
sympathetic, kind, honest, reliable, Islamic, and strong in conviction (RICU, 
2010b: 50). Islamic scholars seem to possess such ‘qualities’ and are claimed 
to be credible messengers for strategic communication or ‘counter-narrative’ 
activities (Marsden and Qureshi, 2010: 137). This finding seems to have been 
adopted by the government through, for example, the ‘Radical Middle Way’ 
   
 
(RMW) project. Created in the aftermath of the London bombings with gov- 
ernment funding worth £1.6 million (Khan, 2009), the RMW used a series of 
noted Islamic scholars and theologians to disseminate what RMW’s web- site 
describes as ‘a mainstream, moderate understanding of Islam that young 
people can relate to’ (Radical Middle Way, 2013). 
Whilst the involvement of the state has been public for all to see in the 
case of the RMW, it is not always so. Recent investigations undertaken by the 
advocacy group CAGE as well as by the Guardian have shown that the RICU 
has been responsible for outsourcing work to the public relations (PR) firm 
Breakthrough Media Network to conceal its involvement in the cre- ation of 
propaganda that targets Muslim communities in the UK and overseas (Cobain 
et al., 2016a, 2016c; Hayes and Qureshi, 2016). The former head   of the 
RICU, Richard Chalk, has also worked for the UK PR firm Bell Pot- tinger, 
which was paid $500 million by the US military to produce ‘black’ propaganda 
videos falsely attributed to al-Qaida in Iraq (Cobain et al., 2016b; Black and 
Fielding-Smith, 2016). ‘Black propaganda’, according to Jowett and O’Donnell 
(2012: 18), is a communicative practice that seeks to disseminate information 
that ‘comes from a source that is concealed or credited to a false authority that 
intends to spread lies, fabrications and deceptions’. Whilst some of the 
campaigns undertaken by the RICU seem not to entail outright ‘lies’ 
– for example, the emphasis on the participation of Muslim athletes during 
the 2012 London Olympics as a way of ‘delegitimising the Olympic Games 
as a target for terrorism’ (Cobain et al., 2016c) was not a ‘lie’ – the RICU has 
sought to deceive audiences by concealing its involvement in these propaganda 
campaigns. The lying here then is through ‘omission’ rather than ‘commis- 
sion’. In his seminal study on propaganda, Ellul (1969: x) observes that rather 
than outright lies, propaganda operates on the basis of ‘different kinds of truth 
– half truth, limited truth, [and] truth out of context’. Such practices show 
two things. Firstly, that so-called ‘strategic communication’ activity is a lot 
closer to classic definitions of (‘black’) propaganda than those who support the 
practice would like to believe (see, for example, Tatham, 2008: 20). Secondly, 
they show how highly militarised, deceptive, and manipulative communica- 
tive practices have been integrated into Prevent. While such practices may be 
an anathema to ideas around democratic accountability and transparency, this 
has not stopped the UK military from encouraging their use. The latest UK 
Counterinsurgency Field Manual, for example, states: 
 
Information operations will on occasions require an aggressive and manipulative 
approach to delivering messages (usually through the PSYOPS tool). This is 
essential in order to attack, undermine and defeat the will, understanding and 
capability of insurgents. (Ministry of Defence, 2009: 6-5) 
 
The RICU’s activities, however, go one step further since they target not 
just the suspected insurgent but the Muslim community more broadly. 
   
 
This suggests a few things that are worth summarising at this point. Firstly, 
the RICU’s research and activities, and its integration of counterinsurgency 
methods and tactics, reveal that it views Muslim communities, in typically 
Orientalist fashion, to be somehow predisposed to committing or supporting 
terrorism and therefore seeks to surveil them and subject them to manipula- 
tive and deceptive propaganda campaigns that are legitimised through talk of 
‘hearts and minds’. Secondly, since the RICU’s use of strategic commu- 
nication is based on integrating research data and intelligence with hard or 
‘kinetic’ power, this strongly suggests that this form of propaganda is more 
about coercing individuals and communities into particular modes of think- 
ing and behaving than it is about persuasion or ‘consent’. Thirdly, the use  of 
propaganda that seems to be directed at specific segments of the Muslim 
community as well as the Muslim community more broadly strongly sug- 
gests that in practice, the dichotomy between coercion and consent, Pursue 
and Prevent, and ultimately, civilian and combatant is false. Prevent, in other 
words, operates as a coercive policy masquerading as persuasion, social inclu- 
sion, and safeguarding. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The UK’s CONTEST strategy has integrated key elements of counterinsur- 
gency doctrine and practice into its remit, especially on matters involving 
surveillance and propaganda. Such ideas and practices have been integrated 
because groups such as al-Qaida and more recently Islamic State are claimed 
to constitute a global insurgency that uses not only terrorism and violence in 
the furtherance of strategic political objectives but also non-violent tech- 
niques and tactics in order to generate legitimacy, support, and consent for 
its actions and agenda. Whilst a counter-terrorism strategy is important,      it 
is claimed to be limited in what it can achieve since it largely revolves around 
employing hard-power or violence. Since counterinsurgency seeks to employ 
limited levels of hard-power or violence and instead opts for ‘non- kinetic’ or 
‘non-violent’ action that draws upon civil, military, and political power to 
destroy the insurgency by securing the acquiescence (or the ‘hearts and 
minds’) of wider communities and populations, it is claimed to be   more 
appropriate for fighting the ‘war on terror’. The use of non-violent or non-
kinetic tactics, however, does not mean that counter-terrorism policy has 
somehow become about social inclusivity, welfare, and reform. As this article 
has demonstrated, counter-terrorism policy is about excluding and pre-
emptively incapacitating individuals and groups by drawing on sophis- ticated 
and highly coercive surveillance and propaganda practices targeted  at not 
only those considered to be ‘future’ terrorists but those individu-    als and 
communities who speak through the ‘language of Islam’ (Sayyid, 2015: 17). 
What this ultimately reveals is that the often-made distinction 
   
 
between Pursue and Prevent and combatant and civilian is, in practice,  false. 
The use of ‘soft-power’ or ‘hearts and minds’ activity is also less about the 
persuading and ‘safeguarding’ of Muslims and more about disciplining and 
controlling those individuals choosing to exercise a distinct Muslim agency 
(Sayyid, 2010: 15). Such an approach challenges the liberal claim  that 
counter-terrorism policy is about social inclusivity and ‘safeguarding’  or that 
the UK is a multicultural, post-racial society in which the demo- cratic 
government is transparent and accountable to the people. 
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Note 
1. Commander Steve Tatham is a UK military officer well known for encouraging 
the use of strategic communication as a way of fighting and preventing conflict 
(see MacKay and Tatham, 2011). 
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